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ABSTRACT 
This article provides a quantitative analysis of the effects of Pakistan 
government domestic wheat procurement, sales, and trade policies on wheat 
supply, demand, prices, and overall inflation.  Analysis of price multipliers 
indicates that increases in wheat procurement prices (one means of promoting 
domestic procurement) have relatively small effects on overall price levels. 
Partial equilibrium analysis of wheat markets suggests that fluctuations in 
production, rather than market manipulation, are plausible explanations for price 
increases in recent years.  Comparisons of domestic and international prices 
suggest that promoting private sector imports is one alternative for increasing 
supply and stabilising market prices, particularly in years of production 
shortfalls.  Overall, this paper concludes that market forces play a dominant role 
in price determination in Pakistan, and that policies that promote the private 
sector wheat trade can both increase price stability and reduce fiscal costs. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION* 
Wheat plays a central role in Pakistan’s food economy, both in terms of 
production and consumption.  Because of the importance of wheat, successive 
governments of Pakistan since Independence have intervened heavily in wheat 
markets, procuring wheat at administratively set prices to support farmer 
incomes and subsidising wheat sales to flour mills or directly to consumers with 
the objective of stabilising prices at levels affordable to consumers [Cornelisse 
and Naqvi (1987); Hamid, Nabi, and Nasim (1990); Dorosh and Valdés (1990); 
Ashfaq, Griffith, and Parton (2001); Ahmad, et al. (2005)].  
Significant steps were taken toward liberalisation of wheat markets from the 
late 1980s to 2000.  However, after consecutive relatively poor wheat harvests from 
2002 to 2004 led to high market prices for wheat, the federal government, as well as 
the government of Punjab, took several policy measures designed to increase 
supplies, add to government stocks and stabilise prices, including imposition of 
restrictions on transport of wheat and subsidising sales of government imports.   
Wheat policy again shifted in 2005, as procurement prices were raised, restrictions 
on transport of grain were removed, and private imports encouraged.   
These policy measures related to domestic procurement quantities and prices, 
private and government imports, and sales prices have had a major impact on wheat 
markets, prices and government subsidies in Pakistan.  Moreover, because of the 
importance of wheat as a wage good and perhaps as a signal of government policy, 
increases in the wheat procurement price are seen as a major factor in determining 
the overall level of price inflation in the country. 
The purpose of this article is to provide a quantitative analysis of the 
effects of these policies on wheat supply, demand, prices and overall inflation, 
drawing out implications for government policy to address wheat price 
stabilisation issues in both the short and long run.  We first present a brief 
summary of the wheat economy in Pakistan and the political economy of wheat 
policy.  Section 3 contains an analysis of the impacts of wheat procurement and 
the procurement price on the wheat market and overall price levels.  Thereafter 
follows a brief analysis of current (2005) wheat production and prices.  The final 
section includes concluding observations and policy implications. 
 
II.  OVERVIEW OF THE WHEAT ECONOMY OF PAKISTAN 
Annual wheat production in Pakistan from 2002 through 2004 averaged 
19.0 mn tons, about 80 percent of which was produced in Punjab.  Over this 
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period, current production accounted for about 90 percent of total supply, with 
the remainder coming from imports and drawdown of government stocks.   
Provincial governments, particularly the government of Punjab, intervene 
heavily in wheat markets.  Government procurement averaged 4.0 million tons 
per year in 2002 and 2003, about 25 percent of production in these years.  
Punjab alone accounted for almost 90 percent of procurement, equivalent to 27 
percent of its production.   
Pakistan Agricultural Prices Commission (APCOM) surveys in major 
wheat surplus districts in Sindh in 1997 and in Punjab in 1998 indicate that 42 
percent (Sindh) and 55 percent (Punjab) of wheat production sold within four 
months of harvest [Salam, et al. (2002)] and that overall about 62 percent of 
production is sold.1  Farms larger than 25 acres accounted for an estimated 81 
percent of wheat sales in Sindh and 67 percent of wheat sales in Punjab (Table 
1).  With 20 percent of wheat production used as payments for harvesting and 
threshing, these figures imply that only 18 percent of wheat production is 
retained for own-consumption in these surplus districts.  Using the same 
percentages for wheat sales/production, total wheat sales (and rents-in-kind) are 
estimated at 15.6 mn tons for the period 2001-02 to 2003-04.  Government 
purchases (domestic procurement) of 3.6 mn tons would then be equal to 19 
percent of total market purchases/sales (Table 2).   
Nationally, however, perhaps as high as 30 percent of wheat production is 
retained for own-consumption.  Using this figure, total wheat sales in Pakistan 
would be about 13.4 mn tons, and procurement of 3.6 mn tons would be equal to 
27 percent of the market.  Similar calculations for the share of government sales 
of wheat to total availability suggest that government sales account for 31 to 38 
percent of total purchases.  Given that government releases (sales to flour mills) 
occur mainly from October through April (the onset of the wheat harvest), and 
that household purchases are likely to be concentrated in these months, these 
rough estimates suggest that government wheat has accounted for 80 percent or 
more of wheat purchases in the last six months of these years (2001-02 to 2003-
04).   
Pakistan Integrated Household Survey (PIHS) 2001-02 data also indicate 
that wheat sales are highly concentrated.  The top 10 percent of wheat farmers in 
terms of sales account for 47 percent of total wheat sales; the top 20 percent of 
wheat farmers in terms of sales (only 5 percent of Pakistan’s households) 
account for 67 percent of total wheat sales.  Overall, only 20 percent of 
Pakistan’s households have a surplus of wheat production over home 
consumption,  and 23 percent of wheat farmers are net wheat purchasers.2  Thus,  
                                                 
1This calculation uses the 1999-2000 to 2001-02 production weights for Punjab and Sindh 
provinces (80/12). 
2Net purchases are calculated on the basis of household production and an assumed per 
capita consumption of 140 kgs/person/year. 
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Table 1 
Production and Sales by Farm Size, Sindh 1996-97 and Punjab 1997-98 
 
Production 
(Tons/Farm) 
% Sold 
(w/in 4 
Months) 
% Sold 
(Est. Total) 
% Sales 
(Est. Total) 
%In-kind 
(Est. Total) 
Sindh: 1996-97      
< 12,5 Acres 4.2 55% 55% 8% 17.7% 
12 to 25 Acres 9.4 50% 63% 11% 17.1% 
25 to 50 Acres 15.6 49% 67% 16% 16.7% 
50+ Acres 47.0 37% 68% 65% 19.4% 
Total 16.8 42% 66% 100% 18.6% 
      
Punjab: 1997-98      
< 12,5 Acres 3.9 42% 42% 11% 23.5% 
12 to 25 Acres 10.7 49% 60% 22% 20.9% 
25 to 50 Acres 20.2 59% 65% 23% 19.8% 
50+ Acres 53.0 61% 68% 44% 20.1% 
Total 12.3 55% 61% 100% 20.8% 
      
Total Sindh and Punjab 12.9 53% 62% 100% 20% 
Source: Calculated using APCOM survey data from Salam, et al. (2002). 
Note: Years indicated are May-April crop marketing years. 
 
Table 2 
Pakistan: Estimates of Size of Wheat Market (2002-03 to 2004-05) 
 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 Average 
Estimate 1: APCOM Survey     
Production 18.2 19.2 19.5 19.0 
Sales (62 Percent of Production) 11.3 11.9 12.1 11.8 
Rents (in-kind; 20 Percent of Production) 3.6 3.8 3.9 3.8 
  Subtotal Sales, Rents 14.9 15.7 16.0 15.6 
Own Consumption 3.3 3.5 3.5 3.4 
  Govt Procurement 4.0 3.5 3.4 3.6 
  Govt Releases 3.4 5.1 4.1 4.2 
Availability 19.1 15.8 16.7 17.2 
Total Purchases 15.9 12.4 13.2 13.8 
Govt Proc/Production 22.2% 18.3% 17.3% 19.2% 
Govt Proc/Total Sales, Rents 27.1% 22.3% 21.1% 23.4% 
Govt Sales/Total Purchases 21.3% 41.5% 31.0% 30.4% 
Govt Sales/Total Consumption 17.6% 32.4% 24.5% 24.4% 
Estimate 2: (Sales: 50 Percent of Production)     
  Subtotal Sales and Rent 12.8 13.4 13.6 13.3 
Govt Proc/Total Sales, Rents 31.7% 26.2% 24.7% 27.4% 
Govt Sales/Total Purchases 24.7% 51.0% 37.7% 36.4% 
Govt Sales/Total Consumption 17.6% 32.4% 24.5% 24.4% 
Notes: Estimate 1 uses shares of the 1997 and 1998 APCOM surveys of wheat farmers. These 
calculations assume that all in-kind payments for harvesting and threshing are re-sold. Years 
shown are May-April crop marketing years. 
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policies that support high producer prices directly benefit only the relatively 
small percentage of wheat farmers with wheat surpluses. 
According to the 2001 FAO Food Balance Sheet for Pakistan, 
consumption of wheat provided 1042 calories/person/day, 42 percent of total 
caloric consumption (2457 calories/person/day).  HIES 2001-02 data show a 
slightly higher absolute figure (1052 calories/person/day), but a much higher 
caloric share (58 percent of 1819 calories/person/day).  Rural consumption per 
capita (10.3 kgs/person/month) is 42 percent higher than urban consumption per 
capita (7.24 kgs/person/month).  Overall, there is little difference between 
quantities consumed across expenditure quintiles in urban areas, though wheat 
consumption rises with total expenditures for rural households (Figure 1).  
Budget shares of wheat are high for both urban and rural poor households: 12.9 
percent for the poorest urban quintile and 15.8 percent for the poorest rural 
quintile.   
Per capita net availability has declined in recent years, because of sub-par 
harvests that were not completely offset by increased government imports and 
draw down of stocks.  From 1990-91 to 2001-02, per capita wheat consumption 
averaged 131 kgs/person/year.  For the three year period, 2002-03—2004-05, 
however, per capita wheat availability (consumption) fell by 14 percent to 113 
kgs/year.  As a result of the reduced availability, real prices of wheat and wheat 
flour rose by 21 and 19 percent, respectively, from 2001-02 to 2004-05     
(Figure 2).  
 
Fig. 1.  Pakistan: Expenditure Shares of Wheat by Per Capita  
Expenditure Quintile, 2001-02 
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Fig. 2.  Real Prices of Major Staples in Pakistan: 1970-2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes:   Real price indices are calculated from data in Pakistan Economic Survey (various issues). 
Prices used are nominal retail food prices deflated by the CPI.   
Three commodity index is an un-weighted average of wheat, wheat flour and basmati rice. 
 
Government Wheat Policy 
Government wheat policy in Pakistan attempts to balance competing 
interests of producers and consumers.  On the production side, policy is aimed at 
increasing wheat productivity (yields) and output, as well as supporting farmer 
incomes.  Increased wheat production has also been seen as part of an overall 
national food security strategy of reducing dependence on food imports.   On the 
consumption side, the government has attempted to enhance household food 
security, particularly through ensuring availability of wheat flour at affordable 
prices and maintaining price stability.  Food policy options are constrained, 
however, by overall fiscal constraints, as well as a desire to minimise fiscal 
subsidies on food.  Moreover, the wheat procurement price has been seen as a 
major determinant of overall inflation because of its role as a wage good and an 
indicator of overall government price policy.  Thus, wheat policy is to some 
degree constrained by inflation targets and inflation policy.   
To achieve these objectives, the federal and provincial governments have 
employed various instruments.  Domestic procurement quantities and prices are the 
major instruments for spurring domestic production and improving wheat farmers’ 
incomes.  The national procurement price and procurement quantity targets are set at 
the federal level, in consultation with provincial governments, though the 
implementation of procurement policy is the responsibility of provincial 
governments and PASSCO (Pakistan Agricultural Storage and Supplies 
Corporation).  Likewise, sales of government wheat, almost exclusively to flour 
mills on a quota basis are largely the responsibility of provincial governments.   
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Provincial governments have generally set procurement targets aimed at 
securing enough grain for planned distribution and stock build-up.  Restrictions 
on the transport of wheat were widely used until the mid-1990s to help insure 
that district officials of the provincial Departments of Food were able to meet 
their procurement targets.  Marketing of wheat was subsequently liberalised, but 
in 2004 the Punjab government re-imposed restrictions on transport of wheat in 
an effort to meet procurement targets and then removed once again in 2005.  
Imports of wheat, undertaken by the federal government, have been used to 
supplement provincial food stocks and enable sufficient wheat sales to keep 
domestic price levels from rising too high.  The government (and private sector 
contractors) also exported wheat in the 2000-01 through 2003-04 May-April 
marketing years following record levels of procurement in 2000. 
There are major fiscal subsidies and economic rents involved in the sales of 
wheat to flour mills at below-market rates.  Wheat issue prices (the price of wheat 
sales to flour mills) do not cover the full cost of procurement (domestic or 
imported), storage and handling.  Provincial food subsidies in 2002-03 reached Rs 
6.8 bn.  This subsidy was 12 percent greater than total Public Sector Development 
Programme budget for the Health Division in 2004-05 (Rs 6.05 bn).  Subsidies on 
sales of imported wheat accounted for another Rs 1.2 bn in that year. 
These rents appear to accrue mainly to wheat millers who receive 
government wheat and perhaps to those involved in these transfers.  Although 
there may be a stipulated sales price of flour, there is no effective enforcement 
mechanism.  Since wheat flour produced from government wheat is not 
distinguishable from wheat flour produced from market wheat, their prices are 
the same.  Profits from sales of wheat milled using government wheat are thus 
substantial, and there are many wheat mills that operate only in the November-
April period and mill only government-supplied wheat.   
Various groups of stakeholders are affected by and often attempt to 
influence these policies.  Farmers, particularly those with net sales, benefit from 
increases in procurement prices and quantities.  Flour millers gain from low 
issue (sales) prices of wheat that are typically below open market prices.  Low 
market prices for wheat and wheat flour benefit net consumers, who account for 
about 80 percent of Pakistan’s population.  Provincial food departments make 
great efforts to achieve domestic procurement targets which provide most of the 
grain for subsequent distribution. Large-scale procurement creates and 
subsidised sales also create the possibility of substantial economic rents.  Sales 
of grain (at the issue price) from the surplus provinces (typically Punjab) to 
other provincial food departments involve an implicit cross-subsidisation to the 
receiving provinces since issue prices do not cover the full costs of procurement, 
storage and distribution.  The provincial and federal governments are also 
concerned with minimising fiscal subsidies and overall inflation.  Finally, 
donors have generally pushed for reductions in food subsidies and an increased 
role of the private sector in wheat marketing. 
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Wheat policies have varied over time, however (Table 3).  Substantial 
wheat market liberalisation took place in the late 1980s with the abolition of 
wheat ration shops and liberalisation of private wheat imports (which were 
subsequently disallowed).  Throughout the 1990s, Pakistan was a net importer of 
wheat, with domestic production typically accounting for about 90 percent of 
availability.  A bumper wheat harvest in early 2000 (i.e. the 1999-2000         
crop year) led to a record procurement of 8.6 million tons and a large increase in 
stocks, some of which were subsequently exported (with an export subsidy).  
However, as noted above, crop shortfalls from 2001-02 through 2003-04, rising 
market prices, problems with government import tenders in early 2004, and low 
quantities of domestic procurement led the Punjab provincial government to 
place restrictions on transport of wheat across district and provincial boundaries 
in 2004.  Procurement prices were raised sharply for the 2003-04 and 2004-05 
wheat crops in an effort to spur procurement, but these price increases have 
raised concerns about their effects on overall inflation. 
 
Table 3 
Chronology of Major Events in Pakistan Wheat Policy and Markets 
 ♦ Independence to early 1980s: substantial government market inter-
vention: ration shops with fixed prices, but substantial leakages and 
malpractices. 
 ♦ November 1987: abolition of wheat ration shops. 
 ♦ Late 1980s: broad trade liberalisation; private sector wheat imports 
allowed in late 80s, but subsequently disallowed. 
 ♦ Bumper harvest in 1999-00 (i.e., March-April 2000): 
 • 8.6 million tons procurement; large increase in stocks. 
 • Subsequent subsidised exports of stocks, including private sector exports. 
 • Incentives for private investment in storage. 
 • Public investments in laboratories for grain testing. 
 ♦ Crop shortfalls in 2001-02, 2002-03 and 2003-04. 
 ♦ Government policy response to shortfalls: 2004: 
 • Restrictions on inter-provincial transport of wheat (and inter-district 
transport of wheat in Punjab). 
 • Government tenders for imports (but some shipments rejected on 
quality basis in early 2004). 
 • Increased procurement price for 2004-05 crop (to 400 Rs/40 kg). 
 ♦ Production recovery and market liberalisation: 2005: 
 • Good harvest 2004-05 (21.1 million tons). 
 • Lifting of restrictions on transport of wheat. 
 • Encouragement of private sector commercial wheat imports. 
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III.  IMPACTS OF GOVERNMENT WHEAT POLICIES 
 
Determination of Domestic Wheat Prices 
In an importing country with free trade, domestic price levels would be 
determined by the international price adjusted for tariffs, transport and marketing 
costs (the import parity price).  Throughout most of the 1990s, Pakistan’s domestic 
wheat prices were below import parity price levels, however, in large part because 
subsidised sales of government commercial imports added to domestic supplies and 
reduced market prices.3  In the wake of a bumper wheat harvest in 2000, domestic 
wholesale prices in Karachi and Lahore remained below their respective import 
parity levels (Figure 3), although in the 2000-01 and 2001-02 crop marketing years 
(May-April) Pakistan was essentially self-sufficient in wheat, drawing on the stock 
build-up from the 2000 harvest.  Note that there was also no incentive for trade from 
India during this period, even if this trade had been legal (Figure 4). 
With the relatively poor harvests in 2004 and 2005, however, domestic 
prices have risen substantially and since mid-2004 wholesale prices in Karachi 
have essentially been at import parity levels.  Wholesale prices in Lahore 
remained at about 18 percent above import parity levels in 2004-05.4 The 
implication is that if private trade were permitted with no tariffs, private sector 
imports would likely supply the Karachi market, adding to domestic availability 
of wheat at no cost to the government.   
 
Impacts of Domestic Procurement on Market Prices 
Given that government policies have limited private imports and kept 
domestic prices below import parity in most recent years, changes in quantities 
purchased or sold by the government in domestic markets, and the prices at 
which the government buys and sells have the potential to affect domestic 
market prices.  In particular, the effect of the volume and price of domestic 
procurement on market prices of wheat depends crucially on whether the 
government buys less than the amount of wheat that farmers and traders are 
willing to sell (i.e. whether procurement is infra-marginal)5 and the volume of 
subsequent distribution of wheat (i.e. the net procurement or distribution).6       
                                                 
3See Ahmad (2003) and World Bank (2004). 
4Note that the import parity price for Lahore is higher than that for Karachi (approximately 
13.2 and 11.9 Rs/kg, respectively in 2004-05), due to additional transport costs from Karachi port to 
Lahore for imported wheat. 
5In this case, market prices will remain above the procurement price and will be set by the 
marginal supply and demand of wheat. 
6Seasonal movements are complex and depend on private market price expectations, private 
storage behaviour and other factors, including the volume and timing of procurement and sales.  This 
article does not cover these issues, though it is important to note that a government sales price that 
does not cover the cost of storage from the time of procurement to the time of sales will discourage 
private storage of grain. 
 9 
Fig. 3.  Import and Export Parity Prices of Wheat in Karachi and Lahore 
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
14.0
16.0
18.0
Ju
l-9
9
O
ct
-9
9
Ja
n-
00
A
pr
-0
0
Ju
l-0
0
O
ct
-0
0
Ja
n-
01
A
pr
-0
1
Ju
l-0
1
O
ct
-0
1
Ja
n-
02
A
pr
-0
2
Ju
l-0
2
O
ct
-0
2
Ja
n-
03
A
pr
-0
3
Ju
l-0
3
O
ct
-0
3
Ja
n-
04
A
pr
-0
4
Ju
l-0
4
O
ct
-0
4
Ja
n-
05
A
pr
-0
5
Pr
ic
e(
R
s/
kg
)
Lahore Wholesale Price Import Parity(Lahore) Import Parity Karachi Wholesale Karachi
Note : Preliminary data using US Hard Red Winter and no quality adjustment.
 
Fig. 4. Wholesale, Import and Export Parity Prices of Wheat in  
Delhi and Lahore 
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Ratios of market prices to procurement prices during the May-August 
procurement season suggest that in several years (from 2000-01 to 2003-04), the 
procurement price did not have a direct effect on the market price.  From 1990-91 to 
1998-99, the average ratio of the Lahore wholesale price to the procurement price 
during the procurement season was 1.085, reflecting marketing  costs from villages 
with procurement centres to the Lahore wholesale market.  In some of these years, 
procurement targets were raised during the procurement season so as to enable 
government to buy all grain offered for sale.  However, during the four-year period, 
1999-2000 to 2002-03, this price ratio fell to 0.974 (a 10 percent decline), evidence 
that procurement during these years was less than the amount offered for sale at the 
government procurement price, (i.e. that procurement was infra-marginal).  The 
implication is that in these years the procurement price was generally higher than 
market prices, and that quantity of procurement was exogenously determined (i.e. 
determined by government policy).  Thus, the procurement price did not have a 
direct effect on market prices in these years.  Rather, the procurement quantity 
determined the market price effects.  In 2003-04, however, a year when procurement 
quantities fell short of targets, the price ratio rose again to 1.100, evidence from 
market prices that the government purchased all grain offered for sale at the 
procurement price.   
In order for the procurement price to directly determine the market price, 
the government must purchase all wheat offered at that price.7  Moreover, in 
terms of the average annual price, and ignoring regional or intra-annual price 
variations, what is important is annual net procurement, i.e. the difference 
between the volume of procurement in the immediate post harvest period and 
gross sales that take place mainly at the end of the crop year.8  In this case, the 
price effect of net procurement is determined in the short-run only by net supply 
(production plus net procurement/sales—private imports are assumed to be zero) 
and the price-responsiveness of consumer demand (the own-price elasticity of 
wheat demand, defined as the percentage change in wheat demand given a one 
percent change in wheat prices).9   
For example, increasing net procurement by 0.5 million tons in 2004-05 
would have reduced availability by 3 percent and raised market prices by an 
estimated 6 to 10 percent.  These calculations also suggest that in order to 
achieve this additional volume of procurement without coercing traders or 
                                                 
7This assumes that the procurement price is high enough so that at least some government 
(unforced) purchases take place.  Otherwise, the government must raise its procurement price to 
levels at which it actually purchases wheat in order to affect the market price. 
8To illustrate this, consider the case of the government buying and selling the same amount 
of wheat.  Again abstracting from regional and intra-annual considerations, with no change in net 
supply in the market, the average market price is unchanged. 
9The time-period for this analysis is from just after the wheat harvest until the next wheat 
harvest; thus, production is fixed (exogenous).  Net government sales are taken as exogenous.  For a 
fuller description of a similar model, see Dorosh (2001).   
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placing movement restrictions on grain, the procurement price would need to be 
6-10 percent higher than originally set.   
 
Impacts of Domestic Procurement on Inflation: Price Multiplier Analysis 
Assuming that government procurement and trade policies are effective in 
raising the procurement and market price of wheat, there remains the question as 
to the overall effect of the procurement price on inflation.  One approach to 
address this question is a price-multiplier model that assumes that all increases 
in costs and prices are passed on to purchasers, i.e. that quantities demanded and 
supplied are fixed, and that the overall price level is determined by a cost-push 
mechanism.10     
For example, given a wheat flour budget share of 8.9 percent, a 13.8 
percent increase in the price of wheat flour (equal to the April 2004 to April 
2005 actual price increase) results in an estimated 1.23 percent increase in urban 
poor CPI without multiplier effects (equal to the budget share times the percent 
increase in price).  Using the fixed input-output production coefficients derived 
from a 2001-02 Social Accounting Matrix for Pakistan [Dorosh, Niazi, and 
Nazli (2003)], the urban poor CPI rises by 1.27 percent, only a slight increase 
since wheat flour is not a major input into other sectors (Table 4).  Assuming 
that  incomes  (wages   and   returns  to  capital)  and   household  spending  also  
 
Table 4 
Price Multiplier Analysis of the Impacts of Wheat and Fuel Price 
 Increases on General Inflation in 2005 
 Production 
Multiplier 
Wheat Flour 
Full 
Multiplier 
Wheat Flour 
Production 
Multiplier 
Fuel 
Full 
Multiplier 
Fuel 
Price Increase 13.80% 13.80% 17.70% 17.70% 
CPI Rural Rich 0.80% 2.50% 1.20% 3.60% 
CPI Rural Poor 1.10% 2.80% 1.20% 3.60% 
CPI Urban Rich 0.60% 2.30% 1.30% 3.70% 
CPI Urban Poor 1.27% 3.00% 1.26% 3.70% 
Weight Urban Poor  0.089 0.089 0.013 0.013 
Weight x Change     
 in Price 1.23% 1.23% 0.22% 0.22% 
Source: Price multiplier model simulations using the 2001 Pakistan SAM. Note that the weights for wheat 
flour and fuel in the CPI of the urban poor are calculated from the 2001 Pakistan SAM. 
                                                 
10This model is the dual of quantity multiplier model used in growth linkage analysis.  See 
Roland-Holst and Tarp (2004).  See Annex 1 for details of the model specification. 
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increase to leave levels of employment and quantities of consumption 
unchanged, multiplier effects are increased.  Under these full multiplier 
assumptions, the wheat flour price increase leads to a 3.0 percent increase in the 
CPI of the urban poor.  By comparison, under the same assumptions, the 17.7 
percent increase in fuel prices in 2004-05 leads to a 3.7 percent increase in the 
CPI of the urban poor. 
These estimates of inflation effects are an upper-bound estimate of the 
impacts of procurement price on other domestic prices (apart from possible 
monetary policy effects) since the analysis assumes that the market price is 
equal to the procurement price and the demand for all goods and services in the 
economy is exogenously determined.     
 
Impacts of Domestic Procurement on Inflation: Econometric Analysis 
Econometric analysis by Khan and Qasim (1996) using annual data 
from 1971-72 to 1994-95 found that a 10 percent increase in the wheat 
procurement price would increase the food price index by 7.4 percent.  
Assuming the same relationship held in 2004, the 16.7 percent increase in 
the wheat procurement price in 2003-04 would increase the food price index 
by 12.3 percent. 
This econometrically estimated effect of wheat prices on inflation is 
roughly 4 times the magnitude suggested by the price-multiplier, which itself 
overstates price transmission due assumptions of exogenous demand.  
Arguably, the econometric analysis captures mechanisms other than simply 
passing on of costs or adjustments to current prices.   This analysis may also 
capture formulation of price expectations by various actors in the economy, 
perhaps because these actors interpret the wheat procurement price as a 
signal of overall government policy.  The short annual time series data 
available, periodic changes in wheat policy, gradual changes in the structure 
of the economy over time, and the influence of other factors make it difficult 
to produce definitive econometric estimates or conclusive interpretations of 
the results, however. 
 
Implications of Production Shortfalls: Wheat Market Prices in 2005 
Preliminary estimates in early 2005 suggested a record wheat crop, but 
market prices remained high even after the produce started arriving in the 
market and continued to rise through early June.  This rise in market prices was 
most likely not due to manipulation of the market by private traders, but due to 
lower than expected production caused by damage from rains and high winds 
leading to poor grain filling and lodging of wheat.  Even a small reduction in the 
wheat crop would have a major effect on market prices.  Crop losses of just 5 
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percent in Punjab could lead to 8-14 percent increase in prices relative to 
expected prices with no production losses (Table 5).11 
Private traders are unlikely to have significant ability to manipulate 
market prices given the large size of the wheat market. For example, the 
estimated value of wheat consumption in Lahore is about 19 crore Rs            
($3.0 mn)/week and Karachi about 28 crore Rs ($4.5 mn)/week.12  Given the 
large number of traders involved and relatively free movement of grain and flour 
into these cities, it would be extremely difficult and financially risky for a small 
group of traders to restrict market flows and store large enough quantities to 
affect market prices.   
 
Table 5 
Price Effects of Domestic Procurement in Pakistan:  
Partial Equilibrium Analysis for 2005 
Imports (mn tons) 0.0 1.4 1.4 2.4 
Production Level Target Target Low Low 
Production (mn tons) 21.400 21.400 20.535 20.535 
Imports (mn tons) 0.000 1.400 1.400 2.400 
Supply (mn tons) 18.260 19.660 18.882 19.882 
Wholesale Lahore (Rs/kg) 13.0 10.2 11.7 9.8 
   % Change Real Price 5.8% –17.3% –5.4% –20.3% 
   % Change Nominal Price 16.4% –9.0% 4.1% –12.4% 
Import Subsidy (bn Rs) 0.0 4.4 2.3 8.4 
High Elasticity: (–0.5)     
   % Change Real Price 3.4% –10.8% –3.3% –12.7% 
Source: Partial equilibrium model simulations. 
   Note:  Base own-price elasticity of wheat demand is –0.3. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The analysis presented in this paper suggests that market forces are major 
determinants of wheat prices in Pakistan and that government wheat policies 
involving domestic procurement and government sales in most years have been 
                                                 
11The partial equilibrium model simulations in Table 5 assume exogenous levels of 
production, total imports and world prices (an import parity wholesale price of wheat in Lahore of 
Rs 13.30/kg, based on a CIF price of wheat in Karachi of $186/ton).  The market-clearing real 
domestic wheat prices is estimated using a wheat demand function based on 2004-05 base year 
levels of per capita wheat demand, an assumed 5 percent growth in real per capita incomes from 
2004-05 to 2005-06, and an income elasticity of wheat demand of 0.2.  See Dorosh (2001) for details 
of a similar model.  
12The calculations for Lahore are as follows: 10 million people x 90 kgs/person/year = 0.90 
mn tons/year or 75,000 tons/month (about 19,000 tons/week) with a value of about 190 mn rupees 
per week at 10Rs/kg.  For Karachi, a population of 15 million is assumed.   
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infra-marginal, involving substantial rents, particularly on sales.  Moreover, 
analysis of price multipliers using a recently developed Social Accounting 
Matrix for Pakistan indicates little evidence of major effects on overall price 
levels and inflation of increases in the procurement price, even under the 
assumption that the procurement price actually directly determines the market 
price.  Thus, setting the procurement prices at levels near expected open market 
price levels is not likely to significantly add to overall inflation. 
In recent years of production shortfalls, (particularly 2004), movement 
restrictions in Punjab province have been only partially effective in achieving 
procurement targets.  Partial equilibrium analysis of price movements, suggest 
that the production shortfalls, rather than uncompetitive market behaviour and 
hoarding are the major reason for price increases. Moreover, these movement 
restrictions may inhibit market development in medium run, by discouraging 
investments in storage. 
Instead of movement restrictions and forced procurement, sales of 
government imports could add to market supplies and limit the rise in market 
prices.  In 2004-05, government imports were 1.4 million tons.  Increasing the 
volume of imports and sales to 2.4 million tons for 2005-06 would reduce 
market prices by an estimated 10–16 percent relative to prices with only 1.4 
million tons of imports (Table 5). 
In order to promote efficiently functioning markets, it is important that 
any government imports and sales be transparent, with planned volumes of 
import announced in advance.  A policy of reducing market prices through sales 
of additional imports is not costless, however.  If imports with an estimated 
import parity cost of 13.3 Rs/kg in Lahore were sold in the wholesale market 
price there, the estimated subsidy would be Rs 4-6 billion (Rs 400-600 crore).  If 
the issue price for this wheat was lower than the market price, the subsidy would 
rise accordingly.   
One alternative to government imports in years of high prices and 
moderate international price levels is to allow private sector imports of wheat 
with little or no tariff, a policy which was actually adopted in mid- 2005.  With 
domestic prices in Karachi in already near import parity, there was an 
opportunity for private trade to add to domestic supplies.  After private imports 
were liberalised, private sector imports began to flow into the country in mid-
2005, stabilising wheat markets at no cost to government. 
Other policy reforms could also enable provincial governments to reduce 
their wheat subsidies substantially and still maintain the ability to address short-
term market shortfalls.  Retaining a separate security stock, but reducing 
domestic procurement and sales volumes, would substantially reduce costs.  For 
example, a year-end security stock of about 1.0 million tons (the average in 
recent years in Punjab province), could be maintained with far less procurement 
and sales volumes (typically about 3 million tons of wheat).  Similarly, setting 
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the sales price to flour mills at levels that cover full costs would also reduce 
subsidy. It would also encourage investment in wheat marketing and storage.   
Given the complexity of wheat markets and wheat policy in Pakistan, 
further analysis is warranted, particularly since wheat markets are constantly 
changing due to changes in annual production, income shocks to households and 
changes in international markets.  Nonetheless, the analysis presented in this 
paper suggests that market forces play a dominant role in price determination in 
Pakistan and that policies that promote the private sector wheat trade can both 
increase price stability and reduce fiscal costs.  
 
ANNEX 1 
METHODOLOGY FOR THE SAM-BASED PRICE  
MULTIPLIER ANALYSIS 
The Social Accounting Matrix (SAM)-based price multiplier analysis 
presented in this paper is based on the methodology of Roland-Holdst and Tarp 
(2005) and the 2001-02 Pakistan SAM [Dorosh, Niazi, and Nazli (2004)].  This 
original SAM included 117 accounts (34 activities, 33 commodities, 27 factors of 
production, 19 household groups, enterprises, government, rest of world and capital).  
For the cost-price analysis, the SAM was aggregated to 22 accounts, including 11 
activities/commodities (wheat, paddy, cotton, other agriculture, wheat flour, rice, 
yarn, textiles, petroleum, other industry and services), 3 factors of production (land, 
labour and capital), enterprises, government, rest of world and capital.13 
In the multiplier analysis, following Roland-Holdst and Tarp (2005), we 
consider production activities, factor incomes and household incomes to be 
endogenous, with exogenous levels of spending by enterprises, government, rest 
of world (exports) and capital (investment).  The methodology used is similar to 
that of standard semi-input output (SIO) quantity multiplier used to measure the 
growth linkages generated from an exogenous increase in production of a given 
sector or an exogenous increase in demand [Haggblade, Hammer, and Hazell 
(1991)].  Instead of considering the effect of a policy shock on quantities with 
prices exogenous, however, we consider the effect of a policy shock (in this 
case, an exogenous increase in the price of wheat) on other prices with all 
quantities exogenous.  
Splitting the SAM into four groups (activities, factors, households and 
other), we define four sub-matrices Aij and Xij where each element of sub-matrix 
Aij is defined as the corresponding element of the SAM Xij divided by the 
column j total, (See Annex Table 1).   
                                                 
13In the aggregated SAM, imports (shown in the intersection of the Rest of World row) and 
the commodity columns were re-classified as negative exports (shown in the intersection of the 
activities/commodities rows and the Rest of World column). 
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Annex Table 1 
Structure of the Pakistan SAM 
 Activities Factors Households Exogenous 
Activities X11 0 X13 X14 
Factors X21 0 0 0 
Households 0 X32 X33 X34 
Exogenous X41 X42 X43 X44 
 
Defining P as the price vector of endogenous accounts (with p1 as the 
price vector for activities, p2 as the price vector for factor accounts, p3 as the 
price vector for household accounts)  and π4 as the price vector for exogenous 
accounts gives the following equations as determined by the accounting 
identities from the columns of the SAM:14  
p1= p1A11 + p2A21 + π4A41 
p2 = p3A32 + π4A42 
p3 = p1A13 + p3A33 + π4A43 
Re-defining the matrix A as: 








=
3332
21
1311
0
00
0
AA
A
AA
A  
and   
ν = π4A(4) 
where A(4) is the sub-matrix of the original A matrix composed by adjoining the 
columns of A41, A42 and A43, gives:  
p = p A + ν = ν (1–A)–1 = νM 
where v is the vector of exogenous costs (taxes, import costs).   
Row j of M can then be interpreted as the effects on prices resulting 
from a unit increase in costs of sector j.  For the wheat price analysis in this 
paper, we examine the effects of exogenous increases in the prices of wheat 
and wheat flour separately, by utilising the elements of their respective rows in 
matrix M. 
                                                 
14Note that since there are no direct payments from the activity account columns to 
households, the matrix A31 is a zero matrix; similarly, the matrices A12, A22, and A23 are also zero 
matrices. 
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